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Structural transformation is a reallocation of labor across sectors. 
In this paper I investigate the impact of structural transformation 
in an open economy on sectoral and aggregate productivity with a 
particular focus on the role of government. While there are potentially 
many sources of structural transformation,1 I focus on labor 
reallocation induced by a windfall of revenue. Furthermore, I only 
concentrate on windfall revenue arising from the export of natural 
resources (fuels, ores and metals); although, the entire analysis is 
applicable to other types of windfalls such as, for example, foreign 
aid, remittances, EU structural funds or war reparations.
The exact focus here is the size of public sector employment in 
resource-rich countries. Governments largely provide non-traded 
services such as law enforcement, defense, infrastructure, arbitration 
and, thus, we can expect the standard “Dutch-disease” mechanism to 
hold, pushing workers towards non-traded sectors in resource-rich 
countries. Higher windfalls of revenue should increase demand for 
both traded and non-traded goods, but since the supply of non-traded 
goods can only be provided locally, more workers need to shift to non-
traded sectors (including the government sector) in order to satiate 
the higher demand for non-traded goods in resource-rich countries. 
As such, I am interested in how the size of public employment should 
optimally vary between resource-rich and resource-poor countries, 
This paper has been prepared for the XVIII Central Bank of Chile Annual 
conference. Thanks to Antonio Mele and Kim Ruhl for useful discussion and comments. 
Previous versions of this work have been distributed as “Spend, Baby, Spend: Windfalls, 
Specialization and Misallocation.” All errors are my own. Email: rls7@st-andrews.ac.uk. 
1. Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2002), Duarte and Restuccia (2010), Rogerson 
(2008), Dekle and Vandenbroucke (2006) and Yi and Zhang (2010), for instance, focus 
on labor reallocation induced by non-homotheticities in agriculture.
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BCCh Vol 22 Series on Central Banking.indb   197 01-12-15   12:09
198 Radoslaw (Radek) Stefanski
whether the extent of government employment observed in resource-
rich countries is efficient and, if not, what the productivity and 
welfare costs of this misallocation are.
I do two things in this paper: First, using a panel of macro 
cross-country data, I demonstrate that the share of public sector 
employment is greater in resource-rich countries than in resource-
poor countries even controlling for the size of other non-traded 
sectors. Second, I construct and calibrate a small, open economy 
model with two production sectors and a government sector in 
which (optimally) higher government employment shares emerge 
as a consequence of windfall-induced labor reallocation. I then use 
a model to compare the optimal and observed size of government in 
order to obtain an estimate of the extent of government misallocation 
and the impact it has on welfare and productivity.
Importantly, the paper builds on earlier work by Kuralbayeva 
and Stefanski (2013). In that paper we did two things: First, 
we showed that resource-rich regions tend to have a) small but 
relatively productive manufacturing sectors and b) large but 
relatively unproductive non-manufacturing sectors. While this 
difference in sectoral size (or Dutch-disease effect) was well 
known and in line with theoretical predictions,2 the productivity 
facts were novel and we showed that standard models were ill-
equipped to replicate them. Second, we constructed and calibrated 
a small, open economy model with two sectors in which observed 
differences in sectoral productivity emerged endogenously as a 
consequence of windfall-induced labor reallocation and subsequent 
worker specialization. Since in the current paper I am interested 
in studying the impact of windfall-induced changes in government 
size on sectoral and aggregate productivity, it is crucial to correctly 
capture the windfall-induced changes in sectoral productivity that 
are not driven by changes in the size of the government sector. As 
such, in this paper, I adapt the framework of Kuralbayeva and 
Stefanski (2013) which does well in reproducing the pertinent facts 
relating to both sectoral size and sectoral productivity in resource-
rich countries in the absence of government.
More specifically, in my model, I assume that manufacturing 
consumption goods are traded while non-manufacturing consumption 
goods are non-traded and that agents have heterogeneous skills 
2. See for instance, Corden and Neary (1982), Matsuyama (1992) or Michaels (2011) 
for theoretical and empirical treatments of this so-called Dutch disease.
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at performing different tasks in both consumption-good sectors. 
In addition, I assume the existence of a government sector whose 
role it is to provide basic public services such as an institutional 
framework, law-enforcement, judiciary, defense, infrastructure 
etc. to the two consumption-good sectors. The government sector is 
modeled as having a positive (external) effect on the productivity 
of both consumption sectors; however, government employees will 
have to be paid through a tax levied on all workers. I will also 
assume that government services cannot be imported from abroad. 
A region with higher windfall revenues will demand more of both 
consumption goods and government services than a region without 
windfalls. While the region’s higher demand for manufacturing 
consumption goods can be satiated by imports from abroad, more 
workers need to be employed in non-manufacturing sectors (including 
the government sector) to meet the higher demand for locally 
produced non-manufacturing consumption goods and government 
services. This generates a reallocation of labor from manufacturing 
to the non-manufacturing sectors and results in a process of self-
selection. Workers who choose to remain in manufacturing despite 
a windfall are those who are most skilled at manufacturing sector 
tasks, which leads to a more specialized and, hence, more productive 
manufacturing sector. Workers who re-allocate to non-manufacturing 
do so only in response to the higher demand generated by the windfall 
and will be less skilled at non-manufacturing sector tasks than 
workers already employed in that sector. This can lead to a more de-
specialized and, hence, less productive non-manufacturing sector.3 
Windfalls thus induce labor reallocation, which, in turn, can generate 
asymmetric changes in sectoral productivity and an increase in the 
size of government.
I calibrate the model and show that the exogenous variation 
in endowments of natural resources does remarkably well in 
explaining the differences in sectoral employment structure and 
the large, asymmetric differences in sectoral productivity observed 
across countries. The model also does well in explaining differences 
in non-manufacturing prices in the data. However, the optimal 
increase in government employment in resource-rich countries 
predicted by the model is significantly smaller than the employment 
3. Although the extent of this de-specialization can be tempered by the higher 
productivity resulting from a bigger government, the exact pattern will depend on the 
particular calibration.
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observed in the data. Resource-rich countries seem to employ far 
more workers in government than the above model would suggest is 
optimal. In order to calculate the cost of this apparent misallocation, 
I feed observed government employment levels into my model, 
and examine the subsequent changes in labor reallocation across 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors and the resulting 
differences in productivity. I find that a ten percentage point 
increase in resource windfalls is associated with a 1.72% lower 
aggregate productivity and a 1.11% lower welfare arising from 
government misallocation. In short, resource-rich countries tend to 
have governments that are too big, and this can have a relatively 
large impact on both productivity and welfare.
The above idea of a negative relationship between natural 
resources and economic outcomes ties into the so-called “resource 
curse” literature (see for example Neary, 1978; van der Ploeg, 
2010; Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier, 2006; Collier and Goderis, 
2007; Collier and Hoeffler, 2005, etc.). While the conclusions of that 
literature are not definitive, there is strong evidence to suggest that 
resource windfalls can generate various negative economic effects 
especially in the presence of bad governance and poor institutions. 
In particular, in that literature, negative economic outcomes are 
often a consequence of a corrupt political process associated with 
higher resource wealth. In short, those papers tend to argue that 
resource-rich countries offer more opportunities for a graft which 
introduces a drag on the economy. The approach taken in this 
paper is different and intentionally complementary. In the model, 
I take the most charitable view of government possible. First, I 
assume that the government sector is a crucial input in production 
and that there is no corruption, no directly wasted resources, no 
electioneering, no graft and no costly power struggles. Second, 
governance in resource-rich countries is assumed to potentially 
be just as effective as in resource-poor countries. Finally, I assume 
that all tax revenues are raised via non-distortive lump-sum taxes. 
Thus, I do my best to give governments in resource-rich countries 
the benefit of the doubt and, as such, my model aims to generate 
the largest possible optimal increase of government employment in 
response to windfalls. In my setup, the only way that government 
can be inefficient is if it employs too many or too few workers 
relative to what is predicted as optimal by the model. Importantly, 
however, I do not take a stand on why governments are the size 
that they are and instead, in my baseline experiment, I simply take 
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public sector employment from the data and analyze the implicit 
misallocation costs of governments that are too big or too small.
Like Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013), the self-selection aspect 
of this work is in the spirit of Lagakos and Waugh (2014), Roy (1951) 
and Lucas (1978), and is closely linked to a similar discussion in 
the development literature. Poorer countries tend to have a larger 
fraction of their labor force employed in agriculture due to subsistence 
requirements. Caselli (2005) and Restuccia and others (2008) also 
show that productivity differences in agriculture between rich and 
poor countries are significantly greater than aggregate productivity 
differences. Lagakos and Waugh (2014) argue that this fact stems 
from the specialization that takes place in the smaller agricultural 
sectors in rich countries. They formalize and test their idea in the 
framework of a Roy (1951) model of self-selection. The outcomes 
of the above models, however, are efficient and do not consider the 
impact of a misallocation stemming from suboptimal government 
size. Furthermore, Lagakos and Waugh (2014) rely on non-homothetic 
preferences and an exogenous variation in aggregate productivity 
to generate a shift of workers across sectors. The current model 
has homothetic preferences and, instead, emphasizes the role of 
exogenous resource windfalls and the existence of a non-traded 
sector as the channel driving labor reallocation. Thus, I avoid what 
Lagakos and Waugh (2014) call the “key challenge” of their setup, 
which is the requirement of large, exogenous productivity differences 
to drive workers across sectors.
Section 1 introduces the data used in this study and establishes 
the productivity and employment facts. Section 2 introduces a 
general version of the model while section 3 considers the role of 
heterogeneity and government in a simple version of the model. 
Sections 4 and 5 present the solution and calibration of the 
general model, section 6 presents the results and section 7 delves 
into the scope of the government misallocation and its impact on 
productivity and welfare. Section 8 examines the role of weights 
and section 9 concludes.
1. DATA AND FACTS
In this section, I briefly review the data and facts pertaining to 
manufacturing and (non-resource) non-manufacturing employment 
shares and productivity constructed in Kuralbayeva and Stefanski 
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(2013). I also examine the data and facts pertaining to employment 
in the government sector. In particular, I show that resource-rich 
regions have a) small and relatively productive manufacturing 
sectors, b) large and relatively unproductive non-manufacturing 
sectors and c) a greater proportion of workers employed in the 
government sector.
Throughout, I follow aforesaid paper and divide economies into 
mining and utilities (MU), manufacturing (M) and non-resource 
non-manufacturing (NM) sectors:4 
  
upcurlybracketleft upcurlybracketmid upcurlybracketright
 = + + + + +
−
−
A C S G M MUTotal Economy
NonRes.Non Mfg. Mfg.
Non Resource Economy
Mining and Utilities
(1)
As in Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013), I focus only on the 
productivity and employment structure of the non-resource economy.5 
Diverging from it, however, I will also consider the proportion of 
non-manufacturing workers employed in the public sector. Notice, 
however, that I will not say anything about productivity in the 
government sector. Constructing sectoral productivity measures is 
challenging and the assumptions needed to calculate government-
specific productivity would be heroic to say the least. In what follows, 
I give a brief overview of the data.
1.1 Data
In Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013), we considered three 
different measures of productivity for the manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sector. We begin with labor productivity, then add 
sectoral physical capital and finally include sectoral human capital. 
In principle, each subsequent measure of TFP is better than the last, 
since it controls for a greater variety of factor inputs. In practice, 
each measure requires additional data that is often hard to come by 
and, as such, has to be estimated. Considering all three measures 
gives a better overall picture of sectoral productivity. However, 
4. The lowest level of aggregation available for all data is the one sector ISIC 
classification. NM here is defined as the sum of agriculture (A), construction (C), (private) 
services (S) and Government (G).
5.  Thus, when we refer to aggregate productivity or sectoral employment share, we 
always mean aggregate productivity of the non-resource economy, or sectoral employment 
relative to non-resource employment.
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when we examine the results and compare the changes of sectoral 
productivity with respect to resource wealth, we find quantitatively 
and qualitatively very similar results across all three measures. As 
such, in this paper, to save space, and since that was the baseline 
measure chosen in the original paper, I will only consider the 
most comprehensive measure of productivity from that paper, Ds, 
obtained as a residual from the following production function
Ys = Ds(Ks)
αs(hsLs)
1−αs (2)
Where Ys is sector s’s value-added, Ls is sectoral employment, Ks 
is sectoral physical capital, and hs is average sectoral human capital, 
so that hsLs is the “quality adjusted” workforce.
6 Constant price 
sectoral value-added data comes from the UN (2009) and is adjusted 
to control for cross-country sectoral price level differences using the 
World Bank’s 2005 International Comparison Program (ICP) price 
data. Employment data comes from the ILO (2003) and physical 
capital is constructed using the perpetual inventory method from 
the PWT. I follow Caselli (2005) in constructing aggregate human 
capital from the Barro and Lee (2010) education data set, and in 
constructing sectoral physical capital. Finally, due to lack of data, 
I assume the ratio of human capital between any two sectors is 
constant across countries and time, equal to the corresponding 
ratio in the U.S., and that labor shares in the last two measures of 
productivity, 1 − αs, are identical across countries, constant over 
time, and equal to OECD averages. For construction details, see 
the appendix of Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013).
Next, I obtain public sector employment data from the ILO 
which “covers all employment of [the] general government sector as 
defined in the System of National Accounts 1993 plus employment of 
publicly owned enterprises and companies, resident and operating at 
central, state (or regional) and local levels of government. It covers 
all persons employed directly by those institutions, without regard 
for the particular type of employment contract.”7
6. I also refer to D as the corresponding measure of aggregate (non-resource) 
productivity.
7. A limited subset of the public employment data is provided at the ISIC one sector 
level and, in that (very limited) subset, public employment is overwhelmingly in the 
non-manufacturing sector. As such, in the baseline experiment of this paper, in order 
to maintain as large a sample of data as possible, I shall assume that all government 
employment belongs entirely to the non-manufacturing sector.
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I follow Sachs and Warner (2001) and Kuralbayeva and Stefanski 
(2013) in defining natural resource “wealth” as the ratio of exports 
of natural resources (fuels, ores and metals) to GDP using WDI 
(2007) data.
In my baseline sample, like in my paper with Kuralbayeva, 
I consider a panel of the 120 richest countries for the 1980-2007 
period.8 I keep all country-date points for which I have all necessary 
data and those that do not deviate significantly across different data 
sources. This leaves me with a total of 33 countries in my sample. On 
average, there are 10 observations for each country, 22 observations 
for each year and a total of 340 data points. Notice that, until 1995, 
the data for public employment is only available once every five years 
and there are very few observations from 1980 and 1985. 
1.2 Summary of Facts
Table 1 shows summary results by comparing the largest 10 
percent of natural resource exporters with the smallest 10 percent. 
The table reproduces the results (pertaining to sectoral size and 
productivity) found in Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013) for the current 
sample of data and adds the new finding pertaining to the size of 
government employment in resource-rich countries. The table shows 
the decomposition of employment according to manufacturing/non-
manufacturing and public/non-public sectors. Furthermore it also shows 
the sectoral productivity (in manufacturing and non-manufacturing) 
normalized by aggregate productivity of each group. From the table 
observe that resource-rich countries: a) employ, proportionally, 27% less 
workers in manufacturing (column 4) and 6% more workers in (non-
resource) non-manufacturing (column 3) than resource-poor countries; 
b) are 24% more productive in manufacturing (column 8) and 4% less 
productive in non-manufacturing (column 7) relative to aggregate 
productivity than resource-poor countries and; c) employ 48% more 
workers in the public sector (column 5) and 10% less workers in the 
non-public sector (column 6) than resource-poor countries.
8. I focus on richer countries for three reasons: First, I am examining more 
disaggregate data than is standard so data quality in poorer countries is a serious 
concern. Second, the mechanism of specialization described later may play a more 
prominent role in richer countries. Finally, focusing on richer countries may avoid the 
worst of unobserved cross-country heterogeneity. Since this procedure may in principle 
result in unobserved selection bias, I have also experimented with a complete sample 
and the results are independent from this cutoff.
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As in that paper, I stress that the productivity results refer to 
relative and not absolute productivity. So, for example, looking at the 
column labeled Dm (column 8) in table 1, the average productivity of 
manufacturing in the top 10% of resource exporters is 37% higher 
than the average aggregate productivity of those same countries; 
whereas, in the bottom 10% of exporters, the average manufacturing 
productivity is only 11% higher than the average aggregate 
productivity in that group of countries. Countries that have low 
aggregate (or sector neutral) levels of productivity will have low 
absolute levels of productivity in all sectors irrespective of the size 
of their resource endowments but may still have high productivity 
in manufacturing relative to their aggregate productivity.
1.3 Earlier Results
 In this section, in table 2, I briefly reproduce the baseline 
regressions of Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013) for the current 
sample of data. For robustness, with respect to these regressions 
and further discussion, see that paper. Column (1) shows the 
regression of manufacturing employment share on the log of the 
windfall measure controlling for changes in output per worker (and 
output per worker squared) as well as controlling for time-fixed 
effects.9 Resource-rich countries employ fewer workers in the 
manufacturing sector and (implicitly) more workers in the 
non-manufacturing sector; a doubling of resource windfalls is 
associated with a 1.4 percentage point decline in the manufacturing 
employment share. These results are statistically significant at the 
one percent level.
Columns (2) and (3) of table 2 show how (the log of) manufacturing 
and non-manufacturing productivity varies with (the log of) resource 
windfalls and aggregate productivity. Higher aggregate (or sector 
neutral) productivity is unsurprisingly associated with higher 
9. Since employment share in manufacturing is simply one minus the employment 
share in non-manufacturing, the regressions for non-manufacturing employment are the 
same with opposite signs on coefficients. As in Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013), I take 
a log transformation of resource windfalls since the data is concentrated near zero. This 
ensures that the transformed empirical distribution is closer to normal. Importantly 
this transformation does not drive the results. Finally, I control for output-per-worker 
and output-per-worker squared since it is a well-established fact that manufacturing 
follows a hump shape with income. This in no way drives my results. For details and 
robustness tests, see Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013).
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Table 2. Baseline Results in Current Sample of Data
 
(1)
M. Emp.
(2)
log(Dm)
(3)
log(Ds)
(4)
log(ps)
log(NRE) -0.014*** 0.068*** -0.012*** 0.048***
 (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.011)
logLprod 0.650***
 (0.127)
sqlogLprod -0.031***
 (0.006)
log(D) 1.458*** 0.888*** 0.838***
 (0.078) (0.011) (0.067)
τe -0.355***
(0.132)
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes
No. of obs. 340 340 340 340
R2 0.256 0.567 0.953 0.480
Source: Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013). 
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
sectoral productivity. However, controlling for differences in aggregate 
productivity, resource-rich countries tend to be more productive in 
manufacturing and less productive in non-manufacturing than 
resource-poor countries. These results are significant at the one 
percent level and are robust to other measures of productivity. A 
doubling of natural resource windfalls is associated with a 1.2% lower 
non-manufacturing productivity and a 6.8% higher manufacturing 
productivity.10
The positive impact of windfalls on the non-manufacturing price 
is an important fact that will be examined later. In Kuralbayeva and 
Stefanski (2013) we constructed a panel of sectoral price level data 
by combining ICP cross-country sectoral price levels with sectoral 
10. I emphasize that these results refer to relative and not absolute productivity. 
Countries that have low aggregate (or sector neutral) levels of productivity will have 
low absolute levels of productivity in all sectors irrespective of the size of their resource 
endowments but may still have high productivity in manufacturing relative to aggregate 
productivity.
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price indices from the UN. Column (4) reproduces the baseline price 
regression from Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013). In particular 
it shows the regression of the log of relative non-manufacturing 
price levels (with respect to manufacturing price levels) on the 
(log) measure of resource windfalls, (log) aggregate productivity, 
energy subsidies from WEO (2011)11 and time-fixed effects.12 I find 
that a doubling of natural resource windfalls is associated with a 
4.8% increase in the price of non-traded goods and these results are 
significant at the one percent level.
1.4 Public Sector Employment Results
Next, I present the novel empirical results of this paper. Table 3 
shows the regressions relating the size of the government sector 
employment with resource windfalls. In particular, column (1) shows 
the regression of government employment share on the log of my 
windfall measure. Resource-rich countries employ more workers 
in the public sector and (implicitly) less workers in the non-public 
sector. These results are statistically significant at the one percent 
level. Column (2), controls for time-fixed effects, while column (3) 
controls for changes in output per worker that may help reduce 
unobserved cross-country heterogeneity. Column (4) adds time-fixed 
effects to the regressions in column (3). In all three cases, the results 
remain largely unchanged. Finally, column (4) adds employment 
shares of the non-manufacturing sector. The results of this last 
regression tell us that, even controlling for the size of other non-
manufacturing sectors, resource-rich countries tend to have a larger 
government sector. Taking column (2) as the baseline result, I find 
that a doubling of natural resource windfalls is associated with a 
1.7% higher public sector employment share and these results are 
significant at the one percent level.
11. Subsidy data is an average of 2008-2010 data. We assume that these subsidies 
are country specific and fixed over the 1980-2007 period.
12. Notice that we included aggregate productivity to control for the so-called 
Penn effect, the observation that richer countries have higher non-traded goods prices 
than poorer countries. Furthermore, as was discussed in Kuralbayeva and Stefanski 
(2013), a potential issue with the ICP price data is that they reflect consumer rather 
than producer prices, which are the focus of the later model. This may be particularly 
important in resource-rich economies, where consumer subsidies are prevalent. We 
control for energy subsidies as an indirect attempt at controlling for the overall level 
of subsidies in a country’s economy.
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Table 3. Changes in Government Employment Share and 
Resource Wealth 
 
(1)
G. Emp.
(2)
G. Emp.
(3)
G. Emp.
(4)
G. Emp.
(5)
G. Emp.
log(NRE) 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.021***
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
logLprod 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.045***
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
NM. Emp. -0.595***
(0.103)
Time fixed effects no yes no yes yes
N° of obs. 340 340 340 340 340
R2 0.045 0.061 0.115 0.139 0.220
Source: See section 1.1. 
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Finally, notice that while in Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013) we 
controlled for time and country-fixed effects, in the above regressions 
I include only time-fixed effects. There are two reasons for this. First, 
I have a far more limited sample of data and therefore not enough 
variation over time in the sample. Most of the variation over time in 
windfalls comes from variation in price which tends to be common 
across countries. Since much of the price variation in natural 
resources took place in the 1980’s and much of our public employment 
data is missing in that period, there is very little temporal variation 
in the remaining data.13 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the 
focus of this paper will be government employment. This type of work 
is often characterized by tenure or unionization and is thus often 
quite unresponsive to shocks over time, at least in the short-run. As 
such, to examine the persistent effects of resource endowments, it 
makes more sense to look at cross-country differences that can be 
interpreted as long-run effects.
13. A rule of thumb here is to regress the independent variable log(NRE) on 
country-fixed effects. If the value of 1/(1 − R2) from the resulting regression is less than 
ten, the rule of thumb suggests that there is enough variation in the data to include 
that variable. In our case 1/(1 − R2) = 11 thus suggesting there is too little variation 
to include country-fixed effects.
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2. THE MODEL
In this section, I introduce a small, open, multi-sector economy 
with heterogeneous agents that can account for the observed facts in 
productivity and employment. The model closely follows Kuralbayeva 
and Stefanski (2013) but introduces a role for government. There are 
three final goods in the economy: manufacturing goods (m), private 
non-manufacturing goods, which, for brevity, I will call services (s) 
and a windfall good which, also for brevity, I will refer to as oil but 
could equally as well be any other natural resource or alternative 
source of windfall revenue. I assume that manufacturing and oil 
are traded internationally, while services are assumed to be non-
traded. Oil is assumed to be an endowment good that is not used 
locally but only exported abroad (and thus serves as a windfall of 
income) while manufacturing and services can be produced locally 
using labor but no oil. I also assume the existence of a government 
sector (the public non-manufacturing sector) which provides 
the manufacturing, service and oil sectors with inputs such as 
institutional frameworks, transportation, rule of law, arbitration, 
etc. that are productivity enhancing, but are external to firms (and 
workers). Thus, while workers can be employed in the government 
sector, the sector produces no final goods directly, but rather provides 
an input that looks like a higher level of productivity to other sectors 
of the economy. Finally, I assume that the external benefits produced 
by government cannot be imported from abroad.
2.1 Households
 
Suppose there is a measure one of agents, indexed by i. 
Preferences are given by 
U c c c c( , ) ( ) ( )s
i
m
i
s
i
m
i
1 1 1
+




− −
−
≡ ν
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
(3)
Each agent in the economy is endowed with a unit of time and 
assumed to have a vector of innate sector specific skills or talents, 
{zs
i, zim}, representing the efficiency of that unit of time in the service 
sector (s) and the manufacturing sector (m). Endowments of skills 
{zs
i, zim}, are exogenous and are assumed to be randomly drawn from 
a distribution common to the whole population N(zs, zm). Since skills 
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are assumed to be perfectly observable, agents earn a wage income, 
wi. The agent is also endowed with a resource tree that provides a 
stream of O units of oil each period. Oil is not directly used by the 
agent but is exported and provides windfall revenues. Finally, each 
agent also potentially faces a lump-sum tax T, paid to government. 
The budget constraint of the agent is thus given by: 
p c c w G L p O T( )s s
i
m
i i
m g o+ ≤ + − (4)
where ps is the relative price of service sector goods and po is the 
relative price of oil determined on international markets. Traded 
manufacturing goods are taken as numeraire. Finally, in the above, 
0 ≤ Gm(Lg) ≤ 1 is a function capturing the external productivity 
benefits of government for the export of oil. These are assumed to 
be positively dependent on the employment size of the government 
sector Lg. I describe this function in more detail in the following 
paragraphs.
2.2 Production
I assume a competitive market in all final good sectors so that 
each worker gets paid its marginal product. The output of worker 
i in sector k = s, m is given by Yk
i = AGkzk
i, where A is aggregate 
(potentially sector specific) efficiency, zk
i is the worker’s sector 
specific productivity and 0 ≤ Gm(Lg) ≤ 1 is the impact of government 
on productivity that is external to workers and firms but depends 
positively on the size of government employment Lg in the manner 
described in the following paragraph. Aggregate output in sector 
k = s, m is given by 
Y Y di AG L L( )k
i k
k
i
k g k
∫ =≡ ∈Ω (5)
where Ωk is the set of agents electing to work in sector k, Lk ≡ ∫i∈Ωkdi 
is the number of workers in private enterprises in sector k and 
L˜k ≡ ∫i∈Ωkzk
idi represents the total effective labor units (privately) 
employed in sector k. Finally, notice that for simplicity, I assume 
that Gm(Lg) is common to both the oil sector and the manufacturing 
production sector.
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2.3 Trade
It is assumed that manufacturing goods and oil are traded while 
service sector goods are not traded. In order to close the model, I 
assume a period-by-period balanced budget constraint given by 
m G L p O( ) 0,m g o =− (6)
where m is the value of imported traded goods (recall that traded 
goods are assumed to be the numeraire) and Gm(Lg) is the impact 
of government on how effective imports are, capturing the idea of 
a type of iceberg transport cost. As mentioned above, for simplicity, 
I have assumed that the government contribution to the productivity 
of exporting (or producing) oil is the same as the corresponding 
term in the manufacturing sector. Finally, in the above setup, all oil 
endowments are exported in exchange for manufacturing imports. A 
country with no oil (i.e., poO = 0) is thus assumed to be closed to trade.
2.4 Government
 
The government employs Lg workers to provide public goods and 
services such as infrastructure, a justice system, law and order, etc. 
that enhance sectoral productivity of the consumption sector Gk(Lg) 
according to the following production function: 
G L
L
( ) 1 ,k g
k
k
g
= − ψ
ψ +
(7)
where ψk ≥ 0 is a sector specific constant capturing the importance 
of government services to production in a particular sector. When 
ψk > 0, G′k (Lg) > 0, that is, more government employees contribute 
more, ceteris paribus, to the output of a sector. Zero employment in the 
government sector implies Gk(0) = 0 and, hence, zero output in sector 
k. Consequently, with ψk > 0, a positive employment in government 
is necessary for production to take place. If ψk = 0, then Gk(Lg) = 1 
and the model collapses to the non-government world of Kuralbayeva 
and Stefanski (2013). I let ΩG be the set of workers employed in 
the government sector while the number of workers employed in 
government is given by Lg ≡ ∫i∈ΩGdi. Finally, for simplicity, and to 
capture the inherent equity of government employment, I assume that 
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government pays each employee the same wage, wg. Alternatively, we 
can think of this as a technological constraint either on the ability 
of government to observe worker specific skills or on the fact that 
production in the government sector requires a constant level of skill. 
As such, the government’s budget constraint, which is assumed to be 
balanced period by period, is given by 
T = wgLg. (8)
Thus, the government levies a per period lump-sum tax on each 
worker to pay for the wages of all its employees.
2.5 Market Clearing
Defining Ω = ΩmUΩsUΩG, the market clearing conditions for 
manufacturing, services and employment are given by 
c di Y m c di Y L L Land and 1
i
m
i
m
i
s
i
s m s g∫ ∫= = =+ + +∈Ω ∈Ω (9)
2.6 Competitive Equilibrium
For each price of oil po, every endowment level of oil O, and for 
a given size of government Lg, equilibrium in the above economy 
consists of a relative price of service goods ps, agent-specific wages w
i, 
and allocations for all agents, firms and government so that labor and 
output markets clear, and trade, as well as the government budget 
constraint, remains balanced period by period.
2.7 Solution
 Each manufacturing and service sector firm chooses a non-
negative quantity of labor to hire. Due to perfect competition, firms 
offer the following wage schedule to consumer i: 
wm
i = AGm(Lg)z
i
m   and  ws
i = ps AGs(Lg)z
i
s , (10)
in manufacturing and service sectors respectively. Consumer i, who 
decides to work in a non-governmental sector, chooses employment 
in the sector that provides a higher wage given its particular talent 
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vector. The wage offer for each worker in non-governmental work is 
thus given by wing = max{ws
i, wim} = max{psAGs(Lg)z
i
s , AGm(Lg)z
i
m}, which 
gives rise to the following simple cut-off rule: a worker i employed in 
non-government work, will choose to work in services if and only if 
p
G L z
G L z
( )
( )
.s
m g m
i
s g s
i> (11)
Finally, given a worker’s wage offer in the private sector, a worker 
will choose to work in government if he receives a higher wage there. 
Consequently, the wage of each worker is given by wi = max{wing,wg}.
Agents take prices, as well as the wage offers arising from the 
firm and government problems, as given (and, hence, the above 
decision rules). Having picked their specialization, they then proceed 
to maximize (3) subject to (4), which results in the following demands 
of each agent: 
c
w G L p O T
p p
c
p w G L p O T
p p
( ( ) )
and
( ( ) )
.s
i
i
m g o
s s
m
i s
i
m g o
s s
= =
+ −
+ν
ν + −
+νσ σ
σ σ
σ σ (12)
Using the goods market clearing conditions in equation (9) and 
the demands of each agent from equations (12), I can show that 
νσps
σYs = Ym + Gm(Lg)poO (13)
Substituting (5) into (13), provides an implicit expression for 
ps as a function of the value of oil endowment poO and the level of 
government employment.14
2.8 Observed and Optimal Government
In this paper I consider two ways of determining government 
employment: First, I will assume the government employment is 
exogenous and taken directly from the data. Second, I will suppose 
that government employment emerges from choices of a benevolent 
14. Notice that I have assumed that windfall income is distributed evenly across 
agents. This assumption plays no role in our results since equation (13) and, hence, the 
equilibrium price and cutoff condition holds regardless of how windfalls are distributed.
BCCh Vol 22 Series on Central Banking.indb   214 01-12-15   12:09
215Government Size, Misallocation and the Resource Curse
social planner who wishes to maximize the utility of workers. In 
particular, a benevolent government will take the demand functions 
of agents–derived above in equation (12) as given, and solve a 
Ramsey-type problem for the optimal size of government employment 
Lg
opt by maximizing the expected utility of workers 
U c L c Lmax ( ( ( ), ( ))),
Lg
i s
i
g m
i
g
0 1
E
≤ ≤
γ (14)
where Eγi(U(cs
i, cim)) = ∫0
1γiU(cs
i(Lg), c
i
m(Lg))di. In this expression, 
γi : R → R is a function that specifies the weight that a government 
places on individual i. If γi = 1, as it will be in our baseline, then the 
government cares equally about every individual. In appendix B, 
I consider the case when different agents have different weights.
3.  HETEROGENITY AND GOVERNMENT
3.1 A Simple Example
To illustrate the impact of worker heterogeneity and government 
on sectoral productivity, I begin with a simple example.15 Suppose 
the skill distribution N is degenerate and given by {zs
i, zim} = {ei , e
1−i} 
for each worker i ∈ [0,1]. Furthermore, assume Cobb-Douglas utility 
(σ = 1), equal utility weights (ν = 1), normalize A to unity and suppose 
that ψm = ψs > 0 so that G ≡ Gs = Gm. Agent i receives wage offers 
ws
i = psGzs
i in services, wm
i = Gzm
i in manufacturing and wg in the 
government sector and will choose to work in the sector that pays 
most. This gives rise to two cutoff agents, i¯m and i¯g who are respectively 
indifferent between manufacturing and government sectors, so that 
wg = w
i¯m, as well as between service and government sectors, so that 
wg = w
i¯g. Suppose that government hires Lg workers. To do so, it will 
have to offer a wage large enough so that Lg = i¯g − i¯m. Using these 
relationships, I can calculate these two cutoffs as a function of price 
and the size of the government employment so that i¯m(ps, Lg) = (1 − log 
ps − Lg)/2 and i¯g(ps, Lg) = (1 − log ps + Lg)/2. I illustrate the problem 
of the worker in figure 1(a) which plots the wage offers in each sector 
and the cutoffs i¯k(ps, Lg) for k = m, g. Agents to the left of i¯m(ps, Lg) are 
15. While I focus on heterogeneous workers, this setup can easily be related to one 
with heterogeneous firms without changing the results.
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relatively more skilled in manufacturing sector tasks and, hence, have 
higher wage offers than in services or government and, hence, choose 
to work in the manufacturing sector. Agents to the right of i¯g(ps, Lg) 
are relatively more skilled in service sector tasks and, hence, have 
higher wage offers and choose to work in services. Agents in between 
the cutoffs will have a comparative advantage in government work 
and will, hence, choose to work in the government sector.
The cutoff values are dependent on the price of service goods 
and the size of government employment. For the moment, suppose 
that government adjusts its wage to maintain a constant level of 
employment and consider the impact of a higher oil windfall. A 
windfall will influence the price of services and, hence, the distribution 
of workers across sectors. A windfall of revenue generates a greater 
demand for both types of consumption goods. To satiate the higher 
demand for non-traded service sector goods, more workers are needed 
in the service sector. However, new workers will choose to work in 
services only if service wages rise, which, in turn, can only happen if 
the service sector price increases. More formally, I can write output in 
each sector as a function of the respective cutoff (and, hence, the price): 
Ys (ps ; Lg) = Gs(Lg)(e − e
i¯g(ps; Lg)) and Ym(ps) = Gm(Lg)(e − e
1−i¯m(ps; Lg)). 
Using these equations as well as the relationship between the two 
cutoffs and equation (13), I can determine the equilibrium price of 
non-manufacturing ps = 1 + poO/e. A higher windfall translates into 
a higher service sector price which results in an increase in service 
sector wage offers. In order for employment in government to remain 
unchanged despite the higher price, wages in the government sector 
must also rise. This results in a shift of workers from manufacturing 
to government and from government towards services resulting in 
a leftward shift of both cutoffs to i¯m
2(ps
2; Lg
s) and i¯g
2(ps
2; Lg
s). As both 
cutoffs shift left, manufacturing productivity (Ym/i¯m = (e − e
1−i¯)/i¯m) 
rises: the workers who remain in the manufacturing sector are most 
skilled in manufacturing sector work. At the same time, service sector 
productivity (Ys/(1 − i¯g) = (e − e
i¯)/(1 − i¯g)) falls: new entrants in non-
manufacturing pull down productivity since they are, on average, 
less skilled than those already employed in non-manufacturing. 
Finally, I can also show that non-manufacturing sector productivity 
(Ys/(1 − i¯s + Lg) = (e − e
i¯)/(1 − i¯g + Lg) also falls as long as the 
government sector is not “too large.”16
16. In particular Lg < −2−log(e + poO) + 2Ω(e(e + poO)) where Ω(·) is the product 
logarithm function.
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Figure 1. The Mechanics of the Model in a Simple Example
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3.2 Government
So far, I have taken the size of government employment as 
fixed. Suppose, however, that the fiscal authority takes the demand 
functions of agents derived above in equation (12) as given, cares 
equally about every agent so that γi = 1, and solves the Ramsey-
type problem for the optimal size of government employment 
Lg
opt in equation (14). Taking the first order condition from this 
maximization problem, and applying the implicit function theorem to 
the resulting first order condition, it can be shown that the optimal 
size of government increases with the size of the oil endowment 
∂Lg
opt /∂poO > 0. Intuitively, higher oil endowment means a greater 
demand for both traded and non-traded goods. Demand for traded, 
manufacturing goods can be satiated by imports from abroad. Demand 
for non-traded goods however, which includes government services, is 
satiated with locally produced goods and, hence, results in a shift of 
labor towards the non-traded sectors of services and government. This 
is shown in figure 1(C). The impact on manufacturing productivity 
is unambiguous: manufacturing productivity will increase both 
due to the smaller size of the manufacturing sector (and, thus, its 
more specialized nature) and the larger government sector, which, 
in turn, increases each workers productivity. The impact on non-
manufacturing productivity is mixed and will depend on specific 
parameters but can potentially be negative.
4. SOLVING THE MODEL
4.1 Distribution Function
To calibrate and solve the model, I must pick a particular 
parametric form for the distribution of skills N(zs, zm) since the Roy 
model cannot be identified from cross-sectional wage data alone.17 
In what follows, I assume that skills are drawn independently 
from a normalized Type II extreme value (or Frechet) distribution 
with CDF 
17. This is because we observe only the outcomes of workers choices (in the form 
of a worker’s observed wages) and not the talent draws (and hence the sectoral wage 
offers) that underpin these outcomes.
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N z e N z e( ) and ( )s
zs
m
zm= =−
−θ − −θ (15)
where θ > 1. The log of a random talent draw log Zi has a standard 
deviation π/(θ√6), where π is the constant. The parameter θ thus 
governs the amount of variation in skills and, hence, the observed 
productivity dispersion: lower values of θ imply more heterogeneity 
in ability and higher productivity dispersion. Notice that I assume 
that θ is common to both manufacturing and service sectors and 
that talent draws are independent of each other. While both these 
assumptions may seem restrictive, they allow me to derive simple, 
analytic solutions which provide insights into the workings of 
the model. In Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013) we extended the 
“non-government version” of the model to allow correlated talent 
draws and different dispersions across sectors and we showed that, 
quantitatively, these channels only played a limited role.
I focus on the Frechet distribution for several reasons. 
First and foremost, this distribution is one of three extreme 
value distributions. According to the Fisher-Tippet-Gnedenko 
theorem from extreme value theory, there are only three types 
of distributions that are needed to model the maximum or 
minimum of the collection of random observations from the same 
distribution. More specifically, the maximum of a sample of i.i.d. 
random variables converges in distribution to either the Gumbel, 
the Frechet, or the Weibull distribution.18 In my case, choosing 
an extreme value distribution can be thought of as capturing the 
distribution of agents’ “best” talents in each particular sector. 
Secondly, of these three distributions I choose the Frechet in keeping 
with the literature. Obviously, Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013) 
chose this distribution. Furthermore, Eaton and Kortum (2001) 
have used this distribution to parameterize a Ricardian model of 
international trade, and Lagakos and Waugh (2014) have used it 
to model talent distribution across sectors. Finally, the Frechet 
distribution also provides very tractable analytic solutions which 
allow for easy interpretation of results and does a very good job of 
fitting the data.
18. Broadly speaking, if one generates N data sets from the same distribution, and 
then creates a new data set that includes only the maximum values of these N data 
sets, the resulting data set can only be described by one of the above distributions. For 
more details see De Haan and Ferreira (2006).
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4.2 Employment
 Since zs and zm are independently drawn from a Frechet 
distribution, the joint density function can be expressed as 
g(zs, zm) = g(zs)g(zm ). Using this, I can relate sectoral labor supply 
allocation to the parameter that controls the dispersion of skills 
across sectors.
First, I start with government employment. In order to induce 
Lg workers to work in the government sector, the government will 
have to offer a wage wg such that enough workers are drawn to that 
sector by earning more than they could in either manufacturing or 
non-manufacturing. Consequently, the chosen wage will be defined by
L P w w w w
P w G z w p G z
g z g z dz dz
,
,
( ) ( )
g g m g s
g m m g s s s
wg
Gs ps
wg
Gm
s m m s
0 0
∫ ∫
= > >
= > >
=
( )
( )
(16)
Taking the level of government employment (and, hence, 
government wage) as given, the expected employment in services 
and manufacturing are 
L P w w w w
P p G z G z p G z w
g z g z dz dz
,
,
( ) ( )
s s m s g
s s s m m s s s g
wg
Gs ps
psGszs Gm
s m m s
0
/
∫ ∫
= > >
= > >
=
( )
( )
∞ (17)
L P w w w w
P G z p G z G z w
g z g z dz dz
,
,
( ) ( )
m m s m g
m m s s s m m g
wg Gm
Gmzm
psGs
s m s m
/ 0
∫ ∫
( )
( )
∞
= > >
= > >
=
(18)
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Given the Frechet distribution of talent draws, the above 
equations can be simplified into the following expressions, which 
only depend on the given level of government employment and the 
price of non-manufacturing goods: 
=
=
=
θ θ
θ θ θ
θ
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
θ
( )
( )
+
−
+
−
−
+
L
G p
G G p
L
L
G
G G p
L
L e
1 ,
1 ,
s
s s
m s s
g
m
m
m s s
g
g
Gm Gs ps
wg
(19)
Solving this for wg I obtain
w
G G p
Llog( )
.g
m s s
g
1
+


= −
θ θ θ θ
(20)
4.3 Output
Normalizing A = 1, the output of each sector can be expressed as 
=
=
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
∞
∞
Y G z g z z dz dz
Y G z g z z dz dz
( , ) ,
( , )
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s s m m s
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m s m s m
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/
/ 0
(21)
Since zs and zm are independently drawn from a Frechet 
distribution, this simplifies to
=
=
Λ θ
Λ θ
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where Λ(θ,Lg) ≡ Γ(1 − 1/θ) − Γ(1 − 1/θ, − log(Lg)), while Γ(⋅) and Γ(⋅,⋅) 
denote the complete and incomplete gamma functions.
For a given level of government employment Lg, using the 
above equations for sectoral output and (13), it is easy to show that 
∂ps/∂poO > 0. It then follows that oil endowments result in a 
reallocation of labor ∂Ls/∂poO > 0 and ∂Lm/∂poO < 0. This shift in labor 
generates specialization (in manufacturing) and de-specialization 
(in services), (∂Ys/Ls) /∂poO < 0 and (∂Ym/Lm)/∂poO > 0. If I instead 
consider productivity in the non-manufacturing sector, I can also show 
that (∂Ys/(Ls + Lg))/∂poO < 0 as long as government employment is 
not “too-large,” i.e., if, and only if, Lg < (1/ θ− 1)(Ls/ Ls+ Lm). Later, in 
the calibration, it is easy to verify that this condition is satisfied for 
every country-date in our dataset.
5. CALIBRATING THE MODEL
5.1 Estimating Skill Dispersion
The parameter θ governs the dispersion of (unobserved) underlying 
skills. To match this parameter to observed variables, I make use of 
the properties of the Frechet distribution. The distribution of wage 
offers in each (non-government) sector is given by 
N w Pr W w Pr p AG Z w
Pr Z
w
p AG
e
( ) { } { }
{ }
s
w
s s s s s s s
s
s
s s
ps AGs ws( )−
−
= ≤ = ≤
= ≤ =
θ θ (23)
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e
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m
m
m
AGm wm( )
= =
= =
≤ ≤
≤ −
θ −θ (24)
These are both Frechet density functions with the same dispersion 
parameter (θ) as the talent distributions.19 Thus, the wage offers in 
the non-governmental sector are the maximum an agent could earn 
19. Notice that these are not distributions of observed wages in a given sector, but 
the distribution of (unobserved) wages that agents could earn if they chose to work in 
a particular sector.
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in either sector wng = max{ws, wm}. The distribution of this wage 
Nng(w) is then the maximum order statistic of wage offers in non-
governmental sectors and is given by
N w N w N w e( ) ( ) ( ) .ng s
w
m
w A Gm Gs ps w( )= = −
θ θ + θ θ −θ (25)
The above distribution is also a Frechet with the same dispersion 
parameter (but with a different mean) as the skill distribution. This 
is a consequence of the assumption that the original talents were 
drawn from an extreme value distribution. Finally, agents with a non-
governmental wage offer drawn from this distribution will choose to 
work in government if, and only if, the wage offered by government 
wg is higher than their non-governmental wage offer. Consequently, 
the distribution of observed wages will be given by
N w N w w( ) ( )1 ( ).ng w wg= ≥ (26)
In order to match the parameter θ, I use a method of moments. In 
particular, I calculate the standard deviation of a sample of log wages 
in a “resource-poor” country and match it to the implied standard 
deviation of log wages in the model. As in Kuralbayeva and Stefanski 
(2013), I obtain cross-sectional wage data from the 2009 U.S. Current 
Population Survey (CPS) and find that the standard deviation of log 
wages in this sample is 0.58.20 Then, I calculate the corresponding 
theoretical standard deviation of the log-wage and choose θ = 2.10 
so that the two match.21
5.2 Government Parameters
To calibrate the government parameters, I first impose the 
restriction that ψ ≡ ψs = ψm so that the impact of government on 
20. Following Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013), Lagakos and Waugh (2014) and 
Heathcote and others (2009), I include individuals aged 25 to 60 who have non-missing 
data on income and hours worked. Wages are before tax and are taken to be the sum of 
wage, business and farm income. The sample is further restricted to include workers 
who average more than 35 hours per week of work and earn at least the Federal 
minimum wage.
21. To do this, notice that for any integrable function f, I can write 
E( f(w)) = f(wg)∫0
wgdGng(w) + ∫wg
∞f(w)dGng(w). Noting that the standard deviation of 
log-wages in the model σ is given by σ = √Var(log(W)) = √E(W2) − (E(W))2, I use the 
above formula and the CDF of Nng(w) to calculate θ.
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productivity is the same in both manufacturing and service sectors. 
The reason for this assumption is twofold: first, it simplifies the 
analysis and, second, there is no a priori reason to believe that the 
impact of government spending should affect productivity more in 
one sector than in another. I choose ψ = 0.015 so that the predicted 
optimal government employment in resource-poor countries in 
the model exactly matches government employment in the lowest 
decile of resource exporting countries in the data of approximately 
17 percent.
This is a logical benchmark. I wish to reproduce the observed 
economic structure of resource-poor countries and examine the 
impact of adding natural resources to those countries. Notice, 
however, that if observed public sector employment in resource-poor 
countries were larger than optimal, then the above assumption 
will underestimate the extent of misallocation and government 
inefficiency in resource-rich countries. In other words, if resource-
poor countries have inefficiently large government, then the scale 
of misallocation in resource-rich countries will be even larger than 
the model suggests. Of course, if resource-poor countries have 
governments that are “too-small” relative to the optimum, because 
higher levels of public-sector employment in resource-rich countries 
could be seen as getting closer to the efficient levels of public sector 
employment, my measure of government inefficiency will over-
estimate the extent of misallocation.
Of the two cases, it seems eminently more plausible that we 
are in the first and that we are underestimating the extent of 
misallocation in resource-rich countries. After all, resource-rich 
countries exhibit worse (rather than better) economic outcomes 
than resource-poor countries, so it would be surprising if it were 
resource-poor countries that were further away from the optimum. 
Furthermore, notice that the public sector employment of 17% is a 
very reasonable choice. For example, in the U.S., government sector 
employment is approximately 13% of the labor force, while in the 
OECD it is approximately 19%. Our assumption that, in resource-
poor countries, optimal government employment share is 17% is, 
thus, a half way point between these two extremes. Nonetheless, 
I demonstrate the robustness of this assumption on ψ in appendix B. 
Finally, I also impose that γi = 1 so that the government cares 
equally about all agents. I also examine this assumption in further 
detail in appendix B.
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5.3 Preference Parameters
Finally, I follow Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013) in estimating 
preference parameters σ and ν. From the household’s problem, I 
can derive an equation relating relative consumer expenditure 
on the relative price cm/cs = (νps)
σ. Taking logs of this equation, 
I estimate elasticity of substitution between manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing goods using ICP data and find that σ = 0.94. 
Finally, I choose the preference parameter to be ν = 0.29 to match 
the employment share in the manufacturing sector in resource-poor 
countries in the model to the employment share in manufacturing 
in the lowest decile of exporters in our sample (approximately 19%).
6. RESULTS
To examine the implications of the calibration, I consider three 
different versions of the model: 1) a model without government, 2) a 
model where government employment is taken directly from the data, 
and 3) a model where government employment is chosen optimally.
Table 4 compares the empirical windfall elasticities from the 
data (shown in tables 2 and 3) with the corresponding windfall 
elasticities implied by the different versions of the model for 
Table 4. Changes in Sectoral Employment and Sectoral 
Productivity Associated with Resource Wealth in the Data 
and Model
 
Data Model Model/Data
(1)
No 
Gov.
(2)
Obs. 
Gov.
(3)
Opt. 
Gov.
(1’)
No 
Gov.
(2’)
Obs. 
Gov.
(3’)
Opt. 
Gov.
M. Emp., Lm -0.014 -0.009 -0.015 -0.008 0.65 1.09 0.53 
M. Prod, Dm 0.068 0.025 0.062 0.025 0.37 0.90 0.36 
NM. Prod, Ds -0.012 -0.007 -0.003 -0.004 0.53 0.21 0.36 
NM. Price, ps 0.048 0.031 0.073 0.030 0.65 1.53 0.63 
G. Emp., Lg 0.017 - 0.017 0.002 - 1.00 0.12 
Source: see section 1.1.
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sectoral employment, productivity and prices.22 First, in column 
(1) and (1’) of table 4, I consider a version of the model without 
a government.23 A doubling of natural resource windfalls in 
the optimal model results in a 0.9 percentage point decline in 
manufacturing employment, a 2.5% increase in manufacturing 
productivity, a 0.7% decline in non-manufacturing productivity 
and a 3.1% increase in the price of non-manufacturing goods. With 
respect to these measures the model does well to explain between 
37% and 65% of the observed changes. This is in line with the 
results of Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013).
In column (2) and (2’) of table 4, I now consider a case with 
government, where the observed government employment 
shares are fed directly into the model. Notice that the findings 
of Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013) continue to hold. The model 
captures all—and even slightly over-predicts—the elasticity of 
manufacturing employment. It also explains 90% of the elasticity 
in manufacturing productivity and 21% of the productivity in non-
manufacturing productivity. Finally the model over-predicts the 
increase in non-manufacturing prices and—by construction—it 
accounts for all of the government employment elasticity.
Finally, in columns (3) and (3’) of table 4, I examine how the 
elasticities in the data compare to the model where government 
employment shares are chosen optimally. The model once more 
does relatively well and accounts for between 36% and 63% of the 
non-governmental employment and productivity. Where the optimal 
model does very poorly is in explaining the elasticity of government 
employment. Here a doubling of windfalls in the model is associated 
with only 0.2 percentage point increase in government employment; 
whereas, in the data, a doubling of windfalls is associated with a 
1.7 percentage point increase. Thus, the model explains only 12% of 
the observed elasticity. This suggests that resource-rich countries 
22. In the data, we measure resource wealth as the ratio of current price exports of 
natural resources to current price GDP measured in international dollars. International 
dollars are constructed to have the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar 
has in the United States. Since the U.S. is a resource-poor country (according to this 
measure), we can view GDP in international dollars as the GDP of a country measured 
using a resource-poor country’s prices. As such, in the model, we construct our resource 
wealth measure as the value of exports of natural resources divided by GDP, measured 
with the prices of a resource-poor country (i.e., one that has p0O = 0).
23. Thus, the model is re-calibrated here in that ψ is set to zero, and all other 
parameters are chosen to match the relevant moments described in the paper. In 
particular, I choose ν = 0.22, θ = 2.23, and σ = 0.94.
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have a much higher government employment share than the model 
predicts they “should.”
The message from this exercise is that the specialization mechanism 
introduced in Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013) is strong enough to 
explain a big part of the large differences in sectoral employment 
shares and asymmetric productivity differences between resource-rich 
and resource-poor countries. Furthermore, the differences in the size 
of government employment between resource-rich and resource-poor 
countries act to magnify the differences in sectoral productivity and 
employment produced by the specialization effect. Thus, the large 
size of government in resource-rich countries effectively amplifies the 
“Dutch-disease” effects of a smaller manufacturing sector and higher 
non-manufacturing prices. Finally, and most importantly, the observed 
government employment shares in resource-rich countries tend to be 
significantly “too-large.” I explore the impact of this latter effect on 
welfare and productivity in the following section.
7.  THE RESOURCE CURSE
 The resource-curse: a well-known, stylized fact relating negative 
economic outcomes to resource windfalls. In the context of this 
paper, the mechanism for a resource curse is clear. If there is a 
misallocation of public sector employment in resource-rich countries 
so that government employment is either too large or too small 
relative to the optimum, we will observe a lower productivity and 
welfare in the model. Table 5 shows the regressions of the ratio of 
observed-to-optimal aggregate productivity and welfare respectively 
emerging from the model versus the size of natural resource windfalls 
(and the log of natural resource windfalls). Observe in the data 
from columns (1) and (2) that a doubling of the natural resource 
windfall is associated with productivity that is 0.6% lower and a 
welfare that is 0.4% lower than it otherwise could be if government 
employment were not misallocated. Equivalently, from columns (3) 
and (4), a one percentage point increase in resource export shares 
in GDP is associated with a productivity that is 0.17% lower than 
it otherwise could be and a welfare that is 0.11% lower than it 
otherwise could be. Notice, that these are big effects. Countries that 
have natural resource exports accounting for 10 percent of GDP, will 
have a productivity that is, on average, 1.7% lower and a welfare 
that is 1.1% lower than it otherwise could be. Countries with 40% 
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resource export share will have an aggregate productivity that is, 
on average, a massive 6.8% lower and a welfare that is 4.4% lower 
than it otherwise could be.
Table 5. Regressions of the Ratios of Productivity and 
Welfare in the Observed and Optimal Models with Respect 
to Resource Wealth 
 
(1)
Rel. Prod. 
(Dobs/Dopt)
(2)
Rel. Welf. 
(Uobs/Uopt)
(3)
Rel. Prod. 
(Dobs/Dopt)
(4)
Rel. Welf. 
(Uobs/Uopt)
log(NRE) -0.006*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
NRE -0.172*** -0.111***
(0.022) (0.021)
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Obs. 340 340 340 340
R2 0.114 0.086 0.181 0.108
Source: See section 1.1. 
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
As I showed before, the misallocation occurs due to a government 
sector that tends to be too large in resource-rich countries. Importantly, 
I make absolutely no claims as to why the size of government 
employment tends to be what it is and, in particular, why government 
employment tends to be higher in resource-rich countries. Government 
employment in resource-rich countries can be non-optimal for a range 
of reasons (some associated with natural resources, and others not), but 
this paper takes no stand on the issue and simply takes the observed 
size of government in resource-rich countries as given. As such, the 
observation that resource-rich countries have larger than optimal 
government is a characteristic of the given sample of data, and will not 
necessarily hold in every single resource-rich country. The findings here 
thus reflect the fact that, in this particular sample of data, resource-
rich countries tended to have public employment that was “too-large.” 
It is, of course, entirely possible to find examples of resource-rich 
countries in the sample that the model predicts had “too-small” or “just-
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right” government. As two such specific examples, consider the cases of 
Chile and Canada in 2007. Chile’s windfall measure was approximately 
20 percent of GDP. This was associated with a productivity that was 
approximately 2% lower and a welfare that was approximately 3% 
lower than they otherwise could have been. This lower productivity 
and welfare was a consequence of a government sector employment 
share that was, according to the above model, approximately 8.4 
percentage points too small relative to the predicted optimum. In 
the case of Canada, its windfall measure was approximately 11% of 
GDP in 2007. This was associated with a productivity that was only 
0.2% lower and a welfare that was approximately 0.1% lower than 
they otherwise could have been. This was a consequence of the fact 
that Canada almost had “the right” levels of government employment 
given its resource windfall.
The above fits in well with the institutional view of the resource 
curse. In particular, by emphasizing the role of government 
misallocation, my theory lends support to arguments by Robinson and 
others (2006), van der Ploeg (2010) and others where explanations 
of the resource curse should be sought outside economic structure 
perhaps, as they suggest, in areas such as political economy, weak 
institutions or property rights.
8. THE ROLE OF WEIGHTS
In the baseline model I focused on governments that weigh 
individuals equally within and across countries so that γi = 1 in 
equation (29). Now I consider a government that can potentially weigh 
workers unequally and I allow these weights to vary across countries. 
In particular, I assume that governments value public sector workers 
differently from private sector workers according to this function:
m i
i
, if
1,
i
g
g
g
=γ
∈Ω
/∈Ω





(27)
In the above, mg is the mass placed on public-sector relative to 
private-sector workers. I allow these weights to potentially vary across 
countries. In particular, I choose mg to reconcile the discrepancies 
between optimal and observed government employment in resource-
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rich countries. Since the baseline model is chosen to match public 
sector employment in the lowest decile, for that particular decile, 
mg will be one and all other parameters will remain exactly as 
in the baseline. To match the observed public sector employment 
share of approximately 25% in the highest decile of resource-rich 
countries, I must set mg = 1.38. Thus, in order for the model to 
optimally reproduce the higher observed public sector employment 
in the top decile of resource-rich countries, the governments in those 
countries must implicitly value public sector workers 38% more than 
private sector workers. Thus, in principle, the model can optimally 
reproduce observed differences in public sector employment between 
resource-rich and resource-poor countries, but only if we assume a 
larger weight is placed by the social planner on government sector 
employees in resource-rich countries. While there may be some 
justification to such a weighing scheme,24 it nonetheless seems to 
be difficult to justify why governments in resource-rich countries 
should place more weight on the public sector than governments in 
resource-poor countries. This is an interesting and suggestive result 
that can be seen as a complement to the discussion of the resource 
curse in the previous section. The higher weights on public sector 
workers can be interpreted as a measure of how much government 
workers in resource-rich countries manage to bias government 
policy in their favor. Thus, this is further indication that there 
may be institutional failures in resource-rich countries that lead 
governments to effectively care more about their own employees than 
the employees of other sectors. Finally, since the model now exactly 
matches employment shares in the government sector, the sectoral 
and aggregate employment and productivity results are once more 
given by columns (2) and (2’) of table 4, although now, given the 
particular choice of weights, the observed government employment 
is optimal and there is no misallocation in the model.
9. CONCLUSION
Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013) show that, in the data, 
resource-rich regions have small and productive manufacturing 
24. For example, in the model, government sector employees will be the lowest 
wageworkers and, hence, placing greater weight on them can be seen as a form of 
progressive taxation.
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sectors and large and unproductive non-manufacturing sectors and 
propose a mechanism that explains these productivity differences 
through a process of self-selection. Windfall revenues induce labor 
to move from the (traded) manufacturing sector to the (non-traded) 
non-manufacturing sector. A self-selection of workers takes place. 
Only those most skilled in manufacturing sector work remain in 
manufacturing. Workers that move to the non-manufacturing sector 
are, however, less skilled at non-manufacturing sector work than 
those who were already employed there. Resource-induced structural 
transformation thus results in higher productivity in manufacturing 
and lower productivity in non-manufacturing.
In this paper, I show that, in addition to the above facts, in the 
data, resource-rich countries also tend to employ a larger proportion 
of workers in the government sector than resource-poor countries. I 
then adapt the model of specialization of Kuralbayeva and Stefanski 
(2013) to include a productive government sector and proceed to 
examine optimal government employment in resource-rich countries. 
In particular, I show that the model can generate higher employment 
in the government sector when windfalls are higher. In a nutshell, 
government services are non-traded. Higher windfalls will increase 
demand for all goods and services, including government services, but 
since these cannot be imported, workers will shift to the government 
sector to satiate demand. Furthermore, even with a government sector, 
the specialization mechanism introduced in Kuralbayeva and Stefanski 
(2013) is strong enough to explain a large part of the asymmetric 
differences in sectoral employment shares and productivity between 
resource-rich and resource-poor countries. In addition, the differences 
in the size of government between resource-rich and resource-poor 
countries act to magnify the differences in sectoral productivity and 
employment shares produced by this specialization mechanism. 
Finally, the observed government employment shares in resource-rich 
countries tend to be “too-large” relative to optimum. In the calibrated, 
best-case-scenario model, government employment is nearly 10 times 
smaller than in the data. This implicit misallocation of resources has a 
large, negative impact on welfare and aggregate productivity. Using the 
calibrated model, I find that a ten percentage point increase in resource 
windfalls is associated with a 1.72% lower aggregate productivity 
and a 1.11% lower welfare arising from government misallocation in 
resource-rich countries.
As such, the above theory and empirical evidence suggest that 
institutions may play a key role in driving the resource curse. In 
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particular, this paper lends support to arguments by Robinson and 
others (2006), van der Ploeg (2010) and others that explanations 
of the resource curse should be sought outside economic structure, 
perhaps, as they suggest, in areas such as political economy, weak 
institutions or property rights which induce governments to be 
particularly large in resource-rich countries.
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APPENDIX A
Data
A.1 Resource wealth
I follow Sachs and Warner (2001) and Kuralbayeva and Stefanski 
(2013) in defining natural resource “wealth” as the ratio of exports 
of natural resources (fuels, ores and metals) to GDP using WDI 
(2007) data. Following Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013), I use PPP 
GDP (in current prices) in the denominator of our measure since 
higher endowments of resources can potentially impact prices of 
non-resource goods (and, hence, measured GDP) influencing both 
the numerator and the denominator of our measure. Using PPP 
GDP keeps prices fixed across countries and, hence, the measure 
only captures changing resource wealth. I have experimented with 
both measures and resource wealth, as well as other measures such 
as the ratio of net exports of natural resources to gross domestic 
product (both observed price and PPP). The results, however, are 
unaffected. For more detail of data construction, see the appendix 
of Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013).
A.2 Labor shares
To calculate the measure of productivity, I need to find expressions 
for labor shares 1 − αs for each sector s. Although these shares can 
potentially vary across countries, due to a lack of comprehensive 
cross-country sectoral data, I make use of OECD data to calculate the 
average annual share of employee compensation for each sector in 
OECD countries for the longest period of time that data is available. 
I calculate the labor share as the ratio of total compensation of 
employees (wages and salaries before taxes, as well as employer’s 
social contributions) over sectoral value-added.25 I find labor share 
in manufacturing is 0.57 while in non-manufacturing it is 0.53.26 
A.3 Sectoral employment
I obtain sectoral employment data for 1980-2006 from the ILO 
KILM online database. To obtain the largest set of employment data, 
I combine ISIC revision 2 and ISIC revision 3 employment data.
25. Tables 7 and 8 in the OECD Annual National Accounts, volume 2, 1970-2008 
(2009 prov.) Detailed aggregates, in millions of national currency.
26. For more detail of data construction see the appendix of Kuralbayeva and 
Stefanski (2013).
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A.4 Prices
Since I want to compare sectoral productivity across countries, 
it is crucial to control for any price differences that may exist 
between sectors, across countries, and over time. To do this, I use the 
methodology and data from Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013). In 
particular, in that paper, we constructed country and sector-specific 
price levels for each sector by combining the sectoral price levels 
from the World Bank’s 2005 International Comparison Program 
(ICP) database and sectoral price indices from the UN (2009). The 
resulting series gives the price level of a particular sector in each 
country relative to the price of the same sector in the U.S. in 2005.
Importantly, as is mentioned in Kuralbayeva and Stefanski 
(2013), although the ICP study is especially built to provide accurate 
cross-country measures of price differences, it does have some well-
known limitations. The main objection is that expenditures are 
valued at the actual transaction prices paid by purchasers and, hence, 
may include delivery charges and any taxes payable (or subsidies 
received) on purchased products. This may be an issue if taxes/
subsidies vary systematically with resource wealth. We recognize 
this fact, but our hands are tied for lack of better data. In the main 
body of the paper, we use a simple version of our model to show that, 
to account for observed productivity differences, unrealistically large 
subsidies would be necessary. Notice also that this re-basing is not 
driving our results and we see similar productivity differences when 
value-added is left in constant U.S. dollars.
A.5 Aggregate capital
I follow Caselli (2005) and Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013) 
and use the Penn World Tables (version 6.3) to construct estimates 
of aggregate capital stock. This is done using the perpetual inventory 
method with the depreciation rate set to 0.06.
A.6 Sectoral capital
I follow Caselli (2005) and Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013) 
in estimating sectoral capital. First, assume that economies 
consist of five sectors: agriculture (A), mining and utilities (MU), 
manufacturing (M), construction (C) and services (S). Then, assume 
that the production function of each sector s is of the form given in 
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equation 2. If I also assume that the rates of return on capital are 
equalized across sectors (an arbitrage condition), then it is easy to 
show that the above functional form implies that for any two sectors 
s and s’, the following holds: 
P Y
K
P Y
Ks
s
D
s
s
s
s
D
s
s
=α α ′
′ ′
′
(A1)
Where PsD is the domestic producer price of sector s goods. For 
more detail of data construction see the appendix of Kuralbayeva 
and Stefanski (2013).
A.7 Aggregate human capital
I follow Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013), Caselli (2005) and 
Hall and Jones (1999) in constructing a measure of aggregate human 
capital from the Barro and Lee (2010) average years of schooling 
data set.
A.8 Sectoral human capital
 To calculate sectoral human capital, I follow Kuralbayeva 
and Stefanski (2013) and Caselli (2005) when estimating sectoral 
human capital. I assume that the ratio of human capital between 
any two sectors is constant across countries and time and equal to 
the corresponding ratio in the U.S. and that labor shares in the last 
two measures of productivity, 1 − αs, are identical across countries, 
constant over time and equal to OECD averages.
A.7 Public sector employment
Public sector employment data is from the ILO which covers all 
employment of the general government sector as defined in System 
of National Accounts of 1993 plus employment of publicly owned 
enterprises and companies residing and operating at central, state 
(or regional) and local levels of government. It covers all persons 
directly employed by those institutions without regard for the 
particular type of employment contract. A limited subset of the public 
employment data is provided at the ISIC one sector level and, in that 
(very limited) subset, public employment is overwhelmingly in the 
non-manufacturing sector. As such, in the baseline experiment of this 
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paper, in order to maintain as large a sample of data as possible, I 
shall assume that all government employment belongs entirely to 
the non-manufacturing sector.
A.8 Summary statistics
Table A1 presents summary statistics for the main economic 
variables: sectoral employment shares (ISIC), public or government 
sector employment share, sectoral TFP (physical and human capital), 
value-added per worker (this is the sum of all sectoral value-added 
data divided by the total labor force), GDP/capita in international 
2005 dollars from the WDI, and the natural resource export share.
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APPENDIX B
Robustness and Extensions 
B.1 Optimality in resource-poor countries
Table B1. Changes in Sectoral Employment and Sectoral 
Productivity Associated with Resource Wealth in the Data 
and Model under Different Assumptions on ψ
ψ = 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model/data
Opt. 
Gov. 
0.015
Opt. 
Gov. 
0.008
Opt. 
Gov. 
0.020
Opt. 
Gov. 
0.038
Opt. 
Gov. 
0.079
M. emp. 0.53 0.55 0.52 0.50 0.46
M. prod. 0.36 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.43
NM. prod. 0.36 0.40 0.34 0.29 0.22
NM. price 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.66 0.71
G. emp. 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.22
Imp. opt. govt. emp.: 0.17 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.33
Source: See section 1.1.
In this section, I carry out a robustness exercise on the parameter 
ψ that influences the optimal size of government. Column (1) of table 
B1 reproduces column (3’) of table 4 and shows the percentage of 
sectoral productivity and employment explained by the baseline 
version of the model under the assumption of optimal government 
size. The top row of the table presents the value of ψ in the current 
calibration while the bottom row shows the observed 17% government 
employment share in the lowest decile of resource-poor countries 
that the parameter was chosen to reproduce. Notice that, in the 
baseline version of the model, only 12% of the increase in government 
employment share between resource-rich and resource-poor countries 
is captured by the model. As mentioned above, it is however eminently 
likely that most countries, including resource-poor countries, have 
some form of inefficiencies that translate into government sectors 
that are too large. In column (2), I set ψ = 0.008 so that the true 
optimal share of government employment is a lower 13% like that 
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in the U.S. In this case the model only explains 9% of the increase 
in government employment share. Notice, however, from columns 
(3)-(5) of table B1, that choosing a larger ψ to match government 
employment shares in the OECD (19%), the EU (25%) or Sweden 
(33%), does indeed result in the model predicting slightly larger 
increases in government employment in resource-rich countries. 
Notice, however, that these increases are still significantly smaller 
than observed in the data and that the different choice of ψ implies 
the model completely misses the level of government employment 
found in resource-poor countries.
B.2 Uncertainty
An interesting extension of the baseline model is to consider the 
impact that uncertainty stemming from the volatility of natural 
resource prices (and, in particular, the inability of government to 
quickly and optimally adjust employment levels in response to these 
shocks) plays in influencing employment, welfare and productivity in 
resource-rich countries. This government stickiness may be another 
reason why resource-rich countries tend to employ too many people 
in the public sector. To examine this idea, I continue to assume that 
the value of a country’s endowment is given by poO in each period; 
however, I now suppose that po ≡ (1 + ε) p¯o. In this expression, p¯o is 
the long-term mean of the oil price while ε is a random variable with 
CDF Gε on domain Ωε. Thus, I assume that the price of oil fluctuates 
around a long-term mean and I examine the implications of this on 
the extent of government misallocation.
I assume that households and firms continue to take the 
realization of poO and Lg as given and proceed to solve their (static) 
problems just as in the baseline. However, I now assume that 
governments are slow to respond to price shocks and no longer 
maximize the weighted welfare of consumers in any given period as 
in equation (14), but rather maximize the expected weighted welfare 
of consumers 
∫ ε ε ε
≤ ≤ ε∈Ωε
γ εE U c L p O c L p O dGmax ( ( ( , ( ) ), ( , ( ) ))) ( ),
Lg
i s
i
g o m
i
g o
0 1 (29)
with expectations taken over price shocks. In this way, governments 
of countries with different endowments levels will choose different 
levels of public sector employment, L¯g(O) but will find it difficult to 
BCCh Vol 22 Series on Central Banking.indb   241 01-12-15   12:09
242 Radoslaw (Radek) Stefanski
re-optimize after a price shock realization. Consequently, for every 
realization of ε ≠ 0, the size of government will be non-optimal 
which will imply a misallocation of workers and hence welfare and 
productivity distortions.
Figure B1. Distribution of Resource Price Shocks in the 
Model and the Data
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
−2 −1 0 1 2 3
Resource price shock
Data
Model
Source: See section 1.1.
The baseline model was calibrated to match a country with zero 
natural resource endowments. Since shocks to ε do not affect such 
a country, the previously calibrated parameters stay exactly as in 
the baseline. Now however, I need to choose the distribution of the 
price shocks, ε. In this experiment I will suppose that ε is an iid, zero-
mean random variable that follows a truncated Frechet cumulative 
distribution Gε on domain [ε, ε]: 
=ε −
−
( )
( ) ( )ε
− ε− −ζ − ε− −ζ
− ε− −ζ − ε− −ζ
G
e e
e e
( )
m m
m m
( )
(B1)
In the above m is the location parameter and ζ > 1 is the 
parameter governing the dispersion of price shocks. The choice of 
the Frechet distribution will allow me to match the thick tails that 
are associated with fluctuations of natural resource prices while the 
truncation will help with the numerical solution of the problem. To 
estimate this distribution, for each country I calculate (poOt/p¯o) − 1, 
which I take to be the realization of ε. I then set m = −1.21 to match 
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the zero-mean of the shocks and ζ = 3.71 to match the standard 
deviation 0.41 of the realizations of ε calculated above. Finally, I set 
the bounds on the distribution so that [ε, ε] = [−1, 1.8]. The lower 
bound is set so that the value of the natural resource can potentially 
hit zero while the upper bound is chosen to match the largest observed 
realization of ε in the data. The kernel density of the realizations 
and the simulated distribution is presented in figure 2. As we can 
see the fit is good and the chosen distribution does well in capturing 
the thick, right tail of price shocks.
Table B2. The Impact of Uncertainty on Public Sector 
Employment, Welfare and Productivity in the Top Decile of 
Resource Exporters
Top decile 
(NR exp. sh.  = 0.17) 
(1)
Lg
opt
(2)
Lg
set
(3)
Lg diff.
(set/opt)
(4)
Welfare diff.
(set/opt)
(5)
Prod. diff.
(set/opt)
ε = ε 0.1881 0.1816 0.9656 0.9998 1.0007
ε = ε 0.1716 0.1816 1.0583 0.9997 0.9997
Source: See appendix, section B.2.
Given the above setup, a country with an endowment of resources 
O will choose a level of government L¯g(O) based on equation (29). 
Since governments are assumed to be unable to re-optimize after 
the initial choice of public sector employment, a price shock which 
changes the value of natural resource endowments will generate a 
misallocation of resources whenever the realization of the shock ε ≠ 0. 
To give the mechanism the greatest chance of working, I consider 
(in the top decile of natural resource exporters) the impact of both 
the maximum and minimum possible shock on the extent of public 
sector employment misallocation and the effect this has on welfare 
and aggregate productivity. The results are shown in table B2.
It turns out that, while the idea of this additional channel 
of misallocation is intriguing, the quantitative impact is tiny. In 
particular, from column (3) of the above figure, notice that government 
misallocation arising from this friction will result in public sector 
employment that is 3.4% lower from the “optimal” when the maximum 
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shock hits, and 5.8% higher when the minimum shock hits. This is 
very small given that the differences in government employment 
in the data between the decile composed of the resource-richest 
countries and the decile composed of the resource-poorest countries 
are closer to 50%. Furthermore, this small misallocation translates 
to even smaller changes in productivity, as seen in column (5), and 
welfare losses of between 0.01% and 0.03% relative to the optimum, 
as seen in column (4). The reason we do not observe a large impact 
from the inability of government to re-adjust is exactly the reason 
why the model does not predict the large observed increase in 
government between resource-rich and resource-poor countries 
in the first place. Since predicted optimal changes in government 
employment between resource-rich and resource-poor countries 
are small, a price shock hitting a country that acts to increase the 
value of the resource endowment of a country would also imply only 
a small re-adjustment. The model thus predicts higher government 
employment in the resource-rich country, but only marginally so. 
Thus, the cost of misallocation from not adjusting in response to a 
shock is very small indeed.
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